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1 
Articles 
COURT-PACKING AND COMPROMISE 
Barry Cushman* 
The controversy precipitated by Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
Court-packing Plan is among the most famous and frequently 
discussed episodes in American constitutional history. During 
his first term as President, Roosevelt had watched with mounting 
discontent as the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a 
series of measures central to his New Deal. Aging justices whom 
Roosevelt considered reactionary and out of touch had struck 
down the National Industrial Recovery Act (“NIRA”), the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act (“AAA”), federal railway pension 
legislation, federal farm debt relief legislation, critical portions of 
the Administration’s energy policy, and state minimum wage 
legislation for women. In the spring of 1937 the Court would be 
ruling on the constitutionality of such major statutes as the 
National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) and the Social 
Security Act (“SSA”), and a number of Roosevelt advisors 
doubted that the Court as then comprised would uphold those 
measures. The odds might have improved had FDR had an 
opportunity during his first term to appoint one or more justices 
to the Court, but no vacancies had occurred. 
In November of 1936, Roosevelt enjoyed a spectacular 
reelection victory, winning the electoral college vote by a margin 
of 523-8. In the wake of this remarkable demonstration of public 
support, the President decided to move against the Court. On 
February 5, 1937, he sent to Congress a proposal to “reorganize” 
the federal judiciary. The bill contained a provision that would 
have empowered the president to nominate to the Supreme 
Court one additional justice for each sitting justice who had not 
retired within six months following his seventieth birthday. At 
 
 * John P. Murphy Foundation Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame. 
Thanks to Patty Cushman, Rick Garnett, and Jill Hasday for helpful comments. 
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the time there were six justices fitting that description. 
Accordingly, the bill, if enacted, would have permitted the 
president to appoint six new justices immediately, thereby 
enlarging the membership of the Court to fifteen. The bill 
ultimately was rejected by the Senate, and never received serious 
consideration in the House.1 A number of scholars have argued 
that its prospects for congressional passage were never very 
bright.2 It is often noted, however, that Roosevelt had numerous 
opportunities to accept compromise proposals for dealing with 
“the Court problem,” a number of which promised much better 
chances of enactment.3 Yet the president repeatedly rejected 
such proposals, insisting instead that congressional leaders press 
forward with his own.4 As Professor James Patterson put it, FDR 
“remained serenely confident, refusing even to discuss the 
possibility of compromise.”5 A number of reasons have been 
offered to explain Roosevelt’s recalcitrance, and I do not dispute 
them here. Instead, I will suggest that such explanations are 
incomplete, and that a fuller understanding of the president’s 
calculations makes his posture appear more rational than is 
commonly thought. 
The reasons for Roosevelt’s rejection of some alternatives 
to enlargement of the Court’s membership are well understood. 
The president and his advisors elected not to pursue proposals to 
 
 1. See, e.g., Barry Cushman, The Court-Packing Plan as Symptom, Casualty, and 
Cause of Gridlock, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2013). 
 2. JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, ROOSEVELT: THE LION AND THE FOX 314 
(1956); Lionel V. Patenaude, Garner, Sumners, and Connally: The Defeat of the Roosevelt 
Court Bill in 1937, 74 SW. HIST. Q. 36, 51 (1970); MICHAEL E. PARRISH, THE HUGHES 
COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY 26 (2002); MARIAN C. MCKENNA, 
FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE GREAT CONSTITUTIONAL WAR: THE COURT-
PACKING CRISIS OF 1937, at 561–62 (2002); E. Kimbark MacColl, The Supreme Court 
and Public Opinion: A Study of the Court Fight of 1937, at vi (1953) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of California at Los Angeles) (on file with the University of 
California at Los Angeles Library). 
 3. See, e.g., JOSEPH ALSOP & TURNER CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS 78, 196-97, 207 
(1938); LEONARD BAKER, BACK TO BACK: THE DUEL BETWEEN FDR AND THE 
SUPREME COURT 182 (1967); MCKENNA, supra note 2, at 301–03, 323–24, 326, 440, 445–
47; JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME COURT 
345 (2010).  
 4. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 3, at 78, 95, 109–13, 161, 197, 207, 210; 
BAKER, supra note 3, at 182, 190, 198–99 (1967); JAMES T. PATTERSON, 
CONGRESSIONAL CONSERVATISM AND THE NEW DEAL: THE GROWTH OF THE 
CONSERVATIVE COALITION IN CONGRESS 122 (1981); MCKENNA, supra note 2, at 303, 
440, 445–47; BURT SOLOMON, FDR v. THE CONSTITUTION: THE COURT-PACKING 
FIGHT AND THE TRIUMPH OF DEMOCRACY 126 (2009); SHESOL, supra note 3, at 327, 
331, 345, 347–48, 439, 443, 446, 457; MacColl, supra note 2, at 288–89, 320, 328, 419, 426–
27. 
 5. PATTERSON, supra note 4, at 94. 
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curtail the Court’s appellate jurisdiction, because this would 
leave lower federal courts hostile to the New Deal with the 
unsupervised power of judicial review.6 Proposed bills to require 
a supermajority of the justices to invalidate federal legislation 
were viewed as likely to be declared unconstitutional.7 
Moreover, if such a statute were upheld, it might reduce the 
opportunities for the Court to protect citizens against 
infringements of their civil liberties.8 
The president also rejected the possibility of amending the 
Constitution to confer upon Congress greater regulatory 
authority than the Court had been prepared to recognize.9 First, 
Roosevelt believed that the problem lay not with the 
Constitution but instead with the Court, and proposing such an 
amendment might be seen as conceding that the Court’s 
decisions invalidating New Deal measures had been correct.10 
Second, there was disagreement within the administration and in 
the broader liberal legal community over the form that such an 
amendment should take, and indeed over whether one should be 
offered at all. Two years of effort by Justice Department lawyers 
had failed to yield an acceptable proposal.11 In addition, any 
amendment would have to garner a vote of two-thirds in each 
house of Congress before winning ratification in thirty-six state 
 
 6. See Memorandum from Alexander Holtzoff, to Homer Cummings, Attorney 
General, on the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 4 (Feb. 6, 1935) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Virginia); ALSOP & CATLEDGE, 
supra note 3, at 29; WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
“Court-Packing” Plan, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 347, 386-87 [hereinafter LEUCHTENBURG, 
Origins]. 
 7. Letter from Franklin Roosevelt to Felix Frankfurter (Feb. 9, 1937), in 
ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE, 1928–1945, at 382 (Max 
Freedman ed., 1967); Memorandum from W.W. Gardner to the Solicitor General, on the 
Congressional Control of Judicial Power to Invalidate Legislation 29-30, 64 (Dec. 10, 
1936) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Virginia); FRANKLIN D. 
ROOSEVELT, [1937 The Constitution Prevails] THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF 
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT lxiv (1941); LEUCHTENBURG, Origins, supra note 6, at 386; 
ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 3, at 29; MCKENNA, supra note 2, at 440. 
 8. LEUCHTENBURG, Origins, supra note 6, at 386. 
 9. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 3, at 28–29; BAKER, supra note 3, at 130; 
MCKENNA, supra note 2, at 440; SHESOL, supra note 3, at 328, 345–46, 381–82. 
 10. ROOSEVELT, supra note 7, at lviii–lxiii; ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 3, at 
28; LEUCHTENBURG, Origins, supra note 6, at 386; William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin 
D. Roosevelt’s Supreme Court “Packing” Plan, in ESSAYS ON THE NEW DEAL 74 (Harold 
F. Hollingsworth & William F. Holmes eds., 1969) [hereinafter Leuchtenburg, “Packing” 
Plan]; Diary of Homer Cummings 165 (Nov. 15, 1936) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with the University of Virginia); Memorandum on Policy 3–5 (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with the University of Virginia). 
 11. ROOSEVELT, supra note 7, at lxii–lxiii; LEUCHTENBURG, Origins, supra note 6, 
at 384; BAKER, supra note 3, at 130; PATTERSON, supra note 4, at 89; SHESOL, supra note 
3, at 348. See Memorandum on Policy, supra note 10. 
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legislatures. Roosevelt did not believe that any acceptable 
amendment could negotiate that course within a reasonable 
time.12 For the same reasons, FDR opposed suggestions for an 
amendment that would have imposed a mandatory retirement 
age on the justices, or imposed supermajority voting 
requirements on the Court, or permitted Congress to overrule 
Supreme Court decisions.13 The President believed that state 
legislatures were dominated by conservative interests and 
lawyers, both of whom would resist any such amendment.14 As 
he wrote to his old friend Charles C. Burlingham, who favored 
the constitutional amendment approach, “You and I know 
perfectly well that the same forces which are now calling for the 
amendment process would turn around and fight ratification on 
the simple ground that they do not like the particular 
amendment adopted by the Congress. If you were not as 
scrupulous and ethical as you happen to be, you could make five 
million dollars as easy as rolling off a log by undertaking a 
campaign to prevent ratification. . . . Easy money.”15 Finally, any 
legislation that Congress might enact pursuant to an amendment 
expanding its regulatory powers would remain subject to judicial 
review and interpretation.16 Such a modification of the nation’s 
charter could not truly defang an obstinately hostile judiciary. 
The consideration and rejection of all of these proposals left 
the administration with only one acceptable solution, and that 
was enlargement of the Court by statute.17 But that did not end 
the possibilities for compromise. There were indications early in 
the struggle that members of Congress might have been 
prepared to accept a bill providing for two or three additional 
 
 12. ROOSEVELT, supra note 7, at lxii; ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 3, at 28–29; 
BAKER, supra note 3, at 130–31; LEUCHTENBURG, Origins, supra note 6, at 384–86; 
Leuchtenburg, “Packing” Plan, supra note 10, at 73; Letter from Franklin Roosevelt to 
Felix Frankfurter, supra note 7, at 381–82 (Max Freedman ed., 1967); Memorandum on 
Policy, supra note 10; Memorandum on Expediting the Amendment Procedure 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Virginia); SHESOL, supra note 3, 
at 328. 
 13. MCKENNA, supra note 2, at 440, 447; BAKER, supra note 3, at 130–31; SHESOL, 
supra note 3, at 348. 
 14. LEUCHTENBURG, Origins, supra note 6, at 384–85.  
 15. SHESOL, supra note 3, at 348 (quoting FDR to Burlingham, February 19, 1937, 
PSF 165, FDRL). 
 16. ROOSEVELT, supra note 7, at lxiii; Leuchtenburg, “Packing” Plan, supra note 
10, at 73; LEUCHTENBURG, Origins, supra note 6, at 386; Memorandum on Policy, supra 
note 10, at 5; BAKER, supra note 3, at 131. 
 17. ROOSEVELT, supra note 7, at lxiv; LEUCHTENBURG, Origins, supra note 6, at 
387; Memorandum on Policy, supra note 10, at 13 (concluding that enlargement of the 
Court by statute “is the only safe, simple, and reasonably prompt way out of the 
dilemma”). 
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justices, even if they opposed expanding the Court’s membership 
to fifteen. Democratic Senator Key Pittman wrote to Attorney 
General Homer Cummings proposing an eleven-member Court 
just three days after the President surprised the congressional 
leadership with his own proposal.18 On February 20 a delegation 
of congressional leaders headed by Vice-President John Nance 
Garner, Senate Majority Leader Joe Robinson, and Senate 
Judiciary Committee Chairman Henry Fountain Ashurst urged 
the President to agree to a compromise providing for the 
addition of two or three additional justices. Roosevelt responded 
by “laugh[ing] in their faces.”19 
This posture continued well into the spring. After the 
Supreme Court had upheld the National Labor Relations Act on 
April 12, Robinson took presidential advisor Joe Keenan aside 
and urged the Administration to declare victory and liquidate 
the Court plan. “[I]f the president wants to compromise,” 
Robinson told Keenan, “I can get him a couple of extra justices 
tomorrow.”20 Yet when this suggestion was conveyed to 
Roosevelt, he again rejected it.21 A few weeks later, while the 
President was on a two-week fishing trip in the Gulf of Mexico, 
Robinson, Pat Harrison, and Alben Barkley invited James 
Roosevelt to lunch to break the news that there were not enough 
votes in the Senate to pass his father’s bill. The Senate leaders 
urged that the President permit them to work out the best deal 
possible, and advisors such as Tommy Corcoran hoped that FDR 
would now suspend his pursuit of the Court bill so that Congress 
might attend to other pressing matters. Yet neither James 
Roosevelt nor Jim Farley was successful in persuading the 
President to accept a compromise, and FDR confirmed his 
resolve to his cabinet and congressional leaders upon returning 
to Washington May 14.22 Just days later, Senator Burton 
 
 18. Letter from Key Pittman to Homer Cummings (Feb. 8, 1937) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the University of Virginia). 
 19. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 3, at 78; SOLOMON, supra note 4, at 126–27. 
Roosevelt also rejected Senator Pat McCarran’s proposal for an increase of two justices. 
ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 3, at 196. The President also received such suggestions 
in correspondence from individual citizens. See John P. Byrne to FDR, Apr. 18, 1933, 
FDRL OF 41-A, quoted in LEUCHTENBURG, Origins, supra note 6, at 350 (proposing a 
Court of twelve justices). 
 20. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 3, at 152–53; BAKER, supra note 3, at 182; 
MCKENNA, supra note 2, at 443; SOLOMON, supra note 4, at 184; ROBERT SHOGAN, 
BACKLASH; THE KILLING OF THE NEW DEAL 198 (2006). 
 21. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 3, at 153–56; BAKER, supra note 3, at 182; 
MCKENNA, supra note 2, at 443: SOLOMON, supra note 4, at 184; SHOGAN, supra note 20, 
at 198; SHESOL, supra note 3, at 435–36. 
 22. BAKER, supra note 3, at 190, 198; MCKENNA, supra note 2, at 450–52; 
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Wheeler informed the White House that Justice Willis Van 
Devanter would announce his retirement from the Court on 
May 18, and hinted that Justice George Sutherland also planned 
to retire soon. The time was ripe, Wheeler urged, for com-
promise on the Court bill. And still, the President refused to 
budge.23 Even after the Court upheld the Social Security Act on 
May 24,24 Roosevelt’s press secretary Stephen Early told Scripps-
Howard newspaper columnist Raymond Clapper that the 
president intended to press forward with his original proposal.25 
Not until June 3 did Roosevelt finally authorize Robinson 
to seek the best compromise that could be salvaged.26 By then, 
however, many were already saying that the time for 
compromise had come and gone.27 Even two weeks earlier, a 
private meeting of Senate leaders of the opposition to the 
President’s plan had revealed that they would no longer brook 
any talk of compromise.28 On May 18, the Senate Judiciary 
Committee voted to disapprove the Court-packing bill by a 
margin of 10-8. Before doing so they discussed and rejected six 
compromise proposals, one of which would have increased the 
Court’s membership to eleven.29 That evening Senator Wheeler 
told reporters, “‘they are begging for a compromise, but they 
ought to know it’s too late to talk of compromise.’”30 Roosevelt 
speech writer Sam Rosenman later wrote of the Court-packing 
plan, “The thing that killed it was Roosevelt’s refusal to 
compromise, when there was still time to compromise.”31 As 
 
SOLOMON, supra note 4, at 190–91; SHOGAN, supra note 20, at 199; SHESOL, supra note 
3, at 443. 
 23. MCKENNA, supra note 2, at 457. 
 24. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 
U.S. 548 (1937). 
 25. Leuchtenburg, “Packing” Plan, supra note 10, at 98.  
 26. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 3, at 215–16; BAKER, supra note 3, at 231-33; 
PATTERSON, supra note 4, 122; MacColl, supra note 2, at 438-39. 
 27. PATTERSON, supra note 4, at 122. “When it began to appear that he would not 
get his way, the President sent Thomas G. Corcoran (Tommy the Cork) to ask me if I 
would sound out some of my friends in the Senate as to whether it would be possible to 
increase the Court by two members. I had no sympathy with the plan to pack the Court, 
but went up to the Hill and saw some of my friends. They made it clear to me that, had 
the President in the beginning asked for only two additional members for the Supreme 
Court, he probably could have got them, but as the score then stood, with everyone 
embittered, the Senate would not authorize any increase.” JESSE H. JONES WITH 
EDWARD ANGLY, FIFTY BILLION DOLLARS: MY THIRTEEN YEARS WITH THE RFC 263 
(1951). 
 28. SOLOMON, supra note 4, at 192–93. See also MCKENNA, supra note 2, at 475; 
SHESOL, supra note 3, at 463–64. 
 29. MCKENNA, supra note 2, at 460–61; SOLOMON, supra note 4, at 198. 
 30. SOLOMON, supra note 4, at 199. 
 31. SOLOMON, supra note 4, at 257 (quoting Samuel I Rosenman, The 
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Tommy Corcoran confided to Harry Hopkins in 1939, “[w]e 
missed a compromise when that could have been 
accomplished.”32 Wheeler later told Homer Cummings, while 
cooling off in the club house after a round of golf at Burning 
Tree, that “the Court fight might have been settled half a dozen 
times during its progress.”33 Cummings himself recognized that 
“[i]t was probably a mistake not to have worked out in early 
season a substantial compromise.”34 Had Roosevelt “shown 
moderation from the beginning,” concludes Professor Patterson, 
“he might have succeeded in obtaining some sort of moderate 
reform; as it was, his tenacity cost him many supporters and 
destroyed his chances for any reform at all.”35 “The plan itself, 
his failure to consult his leaders, and his refusal to compromise 
marked the worst congressional bungling of his career.”36 
Why was the President so resistant to compromise? First, as 
a number of scholars have noted, he believed that he had the 
support of the voters. Though a series of public opinion polls 
indicated that the Court-packing plan never enjoyed the support 
of a majority of respondents,37 Roosevelt persistently maintained 
that “the people are with me.”38 Brimming with confidence—
some have called it “hubris”—in the wake of his great electoral 
victory, FDR ignored signs that his bill was in trouble.39 
Rosenman attributed the loss of the Court-packing fight in part 
to the “mistakes” of “overconfidence” and “stubbornness” on 
 
Reminiscences of Samuel I. Rosenman 11 (July 18, 1958), (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with the Columbia University Oral History Research Office)). 
 32. ROBERT E. SHERWOOD, ROOSEVELT AND HOPKINS: AN INTIMATE HISTORY 
89–90 (1948). 
 33. Diary of Homer Cummings (June 12, 1938) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with the University of Virginia). See also Court Plan Dead, But Not Buried, LITERARY 
DIGEST, May 29, 1937 (“The opposition could point to Roosevelt’s persistent refusal 
time after time to accept a substitute program for his own”). 
 34. Diary of Homer Cummings (August 1, 1937) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with the University of Virginia). Burt Solomon reports that in July of 1937 Homer 
Cummings wrote in his diary, “We could have had an eleven-judge Court with all the rest 
of the bill, but we sinned away the day of grace.” SOLOMON, supra note 4, at 257. This is 
a wonderful quotation; unfortunately it does not appear in the passage of the Cummings 
diary to which Mr. Solomon attributes it, viz., July 25, 1937, see SOLOMON, supra note 4, 
at 317. Nor have I been able to locate the quotation in the Cummings Diaries for 1937, 
1938, 1939, 1940, nor 1941. 
 35. PATTERSON, supra note 4, at 122. 
 36. Id. at 125. 
 37. See Barry Cushman, Mr. Dooley and Mr. Gallup: Public Opinion and 
Constitutional Change in the 1930s, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 7, 67–71 (2002). 
 38. See, e.g., ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 3, at 74, 77; PATTERSON, supra note 
4, at 122; MCKENNA, supra note 2, at 324; SOLOMON, supra note 4, at 184.  
 39. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 3, at 154, 197; MCKENNA, supra note 2, at 
324, 438; SHOGAN, supra note 20, at 238; SHESOL, supra note 3, at 417, 508–09. 
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the part of Roosevelt,40 while Harry Truman chalked it up to 
“that growing ego of his, which notably wasn’t too minuscule to 
start with.”41 
The President was not alone in this overconfidence. It was 
shared and reinforced by many of his advisors. At various stages 
of the fight Cummings, Corcoran, Benjamin Cohen, Joe Keenan, 
Robert Jackson, and Donald Richberg all counseled against 
compromise. Brushing off warnings from the Senate leadership, 
they insisted that victory was at hand and that compromise 
would be tantamount to surrender.42 As Robert Shogan argues, 
the President’s “strongest supporters . . . would have viewed any 
giving of ground as a betrayal.”43 The Nation reflected the view 
of many New Dealers when it insisted that the Court plan was 
“the key to the whole Administration program of Mr. 
Roosevelt’s second term.” Once the opposition had “forced Mr. 
Roosevelt to retreat on the Court bill,” they would “harry the 
Administration forces until they have surrendered all along the 
line.”44 
In 1941, Roosevelt maintained that “[t]ime and again during 
the fight, I made it clear that my chief concern was with the 
objective—namely, a modernized judiciary that would look at 
modern problems through modern glasses. The exact kind of 
legislative method to accomplish that objective was not 
important. I was willing to accept any method proposed which 
would accomplish that ultimate objective—constitutionally and 
quickly. I received, however, no reasonable guarantee or 
assurance that some other definite method would obtain 
Congressional approval. Rumors of compromise were plenty; 
but never a definite agreement or offer. . . . And the best 
legislative advice which I could get from the Congressional 
leaders was that my own suggestion would ultimately be 
approved. That is the reason why no so-called compromise was 
ever submitted by me to the Congress; that is why it was 
 
 40. SAMUEL I. ROSENMAN, WORKING WITH ROOSEVELT 161 (1952). 
 41. Doris Kearns Goodwin, Franklin D. Roosevelt, in CHARACTER ABOVE ALL: 
TEN PRESIDENTS FROM FDR TO GEORGE BUSH 13, 35 (Robert A. Wilson ed., 1995). 
 42. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 3, at 113, 159–60, 214; MCKENNA, supra note 
2, at 443, 464; SOLOMON, supra note 4, at 185. 
 43. SHOGAN, supra note 20, at 237. 
 44. “[I]f he should give up court reform he would be giving up . . . the rest of his 
program as well. He would have to fight every inch of the way for the Black-Connery 
labor-standards bill, for Senator Norris’s power and regional planning bill, for the ever-
normal granary measure and the farm tenancy measure.” Death and Politics, THE 
NATION, July 24, 1937, at 88–89. See also BAKER, supra note 3, at 184. 
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necessary to persist in the plan originally proposed. Had any 
satisfactory compromise been definitely offered which would 
have been effective in attaining the objective, it would have been 
accepted by me.”45 
On the surface, these contentions are not easily reconciled 
with the report, mentioned above, that a delegation of 
Democratic leaders unsuccessfully proposed a compromise of 
two or three additional justices to Roosevelt on February 20.46 
Nor do they seem to square with the fact that in April Senator 
Hatch proposed and the White House rejected a compromise 
bill that would have provided for the appointment of an 
additional justice for each of the four sitting justices who had 
reached the age of seventy-five without retiring, with 
appointments limited to one per year.47 And as mentioned 
above, after the Court’s decisions upholding the National Labor 
Relations Act on April 12, Robinson told Joe Keenan that 
“[t]his bill’s raising hell in the Senate. Now it’s going to be worse 
than ever, but if the President wants to compromise I can get 
him a couple of extra justices tomorrow. What he ought to do is 
say he’s won, which he has, agree to compromise to make the 
thing sure, and wind the whole business up.” Yet once again 
FDR would hear nothing of the sort.48 For these reasons, 
Roosevelt’s recollection of the prospects for compromise has 
been characterized as “somewhat disingenuous,”49 “open to 
question,” and having little “basis in fact.”50 
To be sure, Roosevelt was given ample reason to doubt that 
his bill ultimately would be approved, and proposals for a 
compromise that would have involved the addition of fewer than 
six judges appear to have been more definite than the 
President’s account suggests. But one can readily understand 
why FDR asserted that none of those compromise proposals 
would have been effective in attaining his objective of “a 
modernized judiciary that would look at modern problems 
through modern glasses.” For Roosevelt and his advisors 
 
 45. ROOSEVELT, supra note 7, at lxv–lxvi.  
 46. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 3, at 78; SOLOMON, supra note 4, at 126–27. 
 47. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 3, at 197; MCKENNA, supra note 2, at 447. 
 48. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 3, at 152–56; BAKER, supra note 3, at 182; 
MCKENNA, supra note 2, at 443; SOLOMON, supra note 4, at 184; SHOGAN, supra note 20, 
at 198; SHESOL, supra note 3, at 435–36. 
 49. SHOGAN, supra note 20, at 237. 
 50. MacColl, supra note 2, at 419–20; MCKENNA, supra note 2, at 438–39. 
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believed that there were only three current members of the 
Court who fit such a description, and six who did not.51 
Though they had not always sided with the Administration, 
Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo were the Court’s most reliable 
supporters of the New Deal. Even they had voted to invalidate 
the National Industrial Recovery Act’s (NIRA) Live Poultry 
Code,52 to strike down the first Frazier-Lemke Farm Debt Relief 
Act,53 and to deny Roosevelt the power to remove a 
“contentious” member of the Federal Communications 
Commission.54 Only Cardozo had dissented from the majority 
opinion declaring the NIRA’s “Hot Oil” program uncon-
stitutional on nondelegation grounds.55 But they had voted to 
uphold the Administration’s monetary policy in the Gold Clause 
Cases,56 the Railroad Retirement Act,57 the first Agricultural 
Adjustment Act (AAA),58 the Tennessee Valley Authority 
(TVA),59 the Guffey Coal Act,60 and New York’s minimum wage 
statute.61 A Justice Department memorandum prepared after the 
announcement of Justice Van Devanter’s retirement in mid-May 
therefore classed each of these justices as “liberal.”62 
By contrast, the Four Horsemen—Justices Van Devanter, 
McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler—“were such staunch 
conservatives that almost every time Roosevelt’s Attorney 
General Homer Cummings went into court, he knew he had four 
votes against him.”63 To be sure, they had not always opposed 
the Administration. With the exception of McReynolds, they 
had voted to uphold the TVA.64 In the spring of 1937, they would 
all vote to uphold the Railway Labor Act65 and the application of 
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to an interstate bus 
 
 51. Diary of Homer Cummings (Dec. 26, 1936) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with the University of Virginia). 
 52. Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
 53. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935). 
 54. Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
 55. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
 56. Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935); Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317 
(1935); United States v. Banker’s Trust Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935). 
 57. Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton, 295 U.S. 330 (1935). 
 58. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). 
 59. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936). 
 60. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
 61. Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936). 
 62. Memorandum on the Features of the Proposed Plan (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with the University of Virginia). 
 63. Leuchtenburg, “Packing” Plan, supra note 10, at 69–70.  
 64. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936). 
 65. Virginian Railway Co. v. Federation, 300 U.S. 515 (1937). 
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company.66 And in May, Justices Van Devanter and Sutherland 
would vote to uphold the old-age pension provisions of the 
Social Security Act.67 But in every other major case, the Four 
Horsemen had voted against the New Deal.68 
This meant that if either Chief Justice Hughes or Justice 
Roberts joined the Four Horsemen, FDR’s program might suffer 
defeat by a vote of 5–4 or 6–3. In the Administration’s view, this 
had happened with unsettling frequency. True, these justices had 
supported the Administration in constitutional tests of the 
monetary program69 and the TVA.70 But both men had joined 
unanimous or near-unanimous opinions invalidating the NIRA71 
and the Frazier-Lemke Act.72 Moreover, their votes to invalidate 
the AAA73 and provisions of the Guffey Coal Act74 had proved 
decisive, and Justice Roberts had supplied the fifth and deciding 
vote to strike down the Railroad Retirement Act75 and New 
York’s minimum wage law.76 Hughes and Roberts simply were 
not sufficiently reliable. For this reason, even after the 1937 
decisions upholding Washington State’s minimum wage law,77 
the NLRA,78 and the Social Security Act,79 the aforementioned 
Justice Department memo classed them with the Four 
Horsemen as “conservative.”80 
 
 66. Washington, Virginia, & Maryland Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142 (1937). 
 67. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937). 
 68. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 
1 (1936); Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); Louisville Joint 
Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935); Schechter Poultry Co. v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton, 295 U.S. 330 (1935); 
Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935); Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935); 
United States v. Banker’s Trust Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 
293 U.S. 388 (1935). See also Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936); 
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934) (McReynolds, Van Devanter, Sutherland, 
and Butler, JJ., dissenting); Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 448 
(1934) (Sutherland, Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Butler, JJ., dissenting). 
 69. Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935); Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317 
(1935); United States v. Banker’s Trust Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935). 
 70. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936). 
 71. Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining 
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
 72. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935). 
 73. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). 
 74. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
 75. Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton, 295 U.S. 330 (1935). 
 76. Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936). 
 77. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 78. Washington, Virginia, & Maryland Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142 (1937); 
Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937); Labor Board Cases, 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
 79. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 
U.S. 548 (1937). 
 80. Memorandum on the Features of the Proposed Plan, supra note 62. 
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The Administration thus believed that it was confronted 
with an unacceptably high probability of six votes opposing the 
New Deal, with only three in support. A compromise allowing 
the President to appoint two additional justices would do 
nothing to ameliorate this, as what had been 6–3 losses would 
now be negative votes of 6-5. Even a three-justice compromise 
was not sufficient to solve the problem. Three additional 
Roosevelt appointees would deadlock the vote at 6–6, but such 
an evenly divided Court might well affirm adverse decisions 
from lower federal courts dominated by more conservative 
appointees.81 More justices would be necessary to ensure the 
safety of the New Deal. 
This view persisted even after Hughes and Roberts joined 
majorities upholding Washington State’s minimum wage law on 
March 29 and the application of the National Labor Relations 
Act to manufacturing concerns on April 12. An unidentified 
Senator captured the views of several colleagues who seemed to 
be cooling toward the President’s proposal: “You don’t run so 
fast for a train once you have caught up with it. . . . The only real 
argument left is this: Is Judge Roberts going to stay where he 
is?”82 But for Roosevelt and Cummings, the fact that this 
question remained open was dispositive.83 A Justice Department 
 
 81. See, e.g., PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 13 (1982) (“in the period 
before 1937 (and for another decade, in fact) the federal bench was dominated by 
conservative Republicans . . . [who] shared . . . a 19th-century outlook on law and 
economics”). 
 82. SOLOMON, supra note 4, at 187 (quoting Albert L. Warner, Roosevelt Presses 
Fight for Court Plan, Delays Labor Bill for Showdown, NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE, 
Apr. 14, 1937). 
 83. See Memorandum on the Wake of West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, Plan 4-5 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Virginia):  
Thus after twenty years of unabated struggle, minimum wage legislation is for 
the first time sustained by the Supreme Court by a bare majority vote. Four 
members of the Court still insist upon putting an interpretation upon the words 
“due process” and “equal protection of the law,” with which not one lawyer in a 
hundred and not one citizen in a thousand would agree. Only by the vacillating 
vote of a single justice was the constitutional right of the state legislatures 
reinstated after what seemed to be a hopeless struggle—to paraphrase Justice 
Holmes—to educate the Justices “in the obvious.” Four out of the nine Justices 
have dramatically revealed that they still entertain a view of the Constitution 
strikingly at variance with that of Chief Justice Marshall and the Founding 
Fathers because the view of the four dissenting judges would obviously make it 
impossible for the Constitution “to endure for ages to come and to be adaptable 
to the various crises of human events.” Unless the present personnel of the 
Court is enlarged, every new and debatable constitutional issue will come 
before the Court with four Justices definitely hostile to any theory which would 
permit the Constitution to be adapted to the needs of the time. If there should 
be any difference among any one of the five Justices whose minds are at all 
open regarding the applicability of the Constitution to new problems—the 
efforts of the legislatures, state or federal, to meet those problems will be 
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memo warned that Hughes and Roberts simply had capitulated 
to “the pressure of shotgun liberalism,” and worried that “[a]fter 
the passage of the Supreme Court statute, Hughes and Roberts 
will have no further incentive for shot-gun liberalism and are far 
more likely to be actuated by impulses of revenge.”84 In a press 
release issued April 14, Cummings cautioned that, 
  Gratifying as these recent decisions are it must be 
remembered that they are five-to-four decisions, and it is 
impossible to predict what will be the attitude of the Court in 
connection with the whole range of necessary legislation 
dealing with child labor, sweat shops, minimum wages, 
maximum hours, old age benefits, and other social matters. 
All these have yet to run the gauntlet of judicial 
interpretation. The loss of one vote in the recent cases would 
have made the Constitution mean something quite different 
from what it appears to mean now, and four members of the 
Court still stand as a battalion of death against all major social 
legislation, state and national. 
  It is not a wholesome situation when an administration, 
under a mandate to carry out a progressive program, must 
face a court of nine, with four votes lost to it in advance. The 
margin is too narrow and the risk is too great.85 
At about the same time, Senator Joseph O’Mahoney of 
Wyoming and Harvard economist William Z. Ripley asked the 
President why he would not compromise now that he had 
secured a liberal majority on the Court. The President 
responded that “a five-to-four majority was not enough for him. 
He said he wanted a Court that would ‘co-operate’ with the 
White House. He needed six new justices who would be friendly 
and approachable, men with whom he could confer, as man to 
man, on his great plans for social and economic reform and 
experiment.”86 Presidential advisors such as Tommy Corcoran, 
 
nullified. It is intolerable that in this period of social and economic change the 
adaptability of the Constitution and the continuity of legal growth should rest 
upon the vacillating judgment and human frailty of a single Justice. 
 84. Memorandum on Features of the Proposed Plan, supra note 62. 
 85. Box 204, Cummings MSS. This view is reiterated in Cummings’s diary entry of 
May 4. Diary of Homer Cummings (May 4, 1937) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
the University of Virginia). 
 86. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 3, at 154–55. See also id. at 161. It does 
appear, however, that Roosevelt was already beginning to think about alternatives to his 
own plan. Homer Cummings reports that at a cabinet meeting on April 9—three days 
before the Wagner Act decisions were handed down—the President was “keen to have 
his own plan go through, but he would not object to a constitutional amendment dealing 
with the membership of the Court. I think at present he inclines to a constitutional 
amendment limiting judicial tenure to nine years instead of for life.” Diary of Homer 
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Ben Cohen, and Robert Jackson counseled FDR against 
accepting Robinson’s offer of a two-justice compromise. An 
eleven-member Court, they cautioned, would not produce a 
“dependable” bench. As Jackson put it to Roosevelt, “[i]f you’re 
going to pack a court at all you’ve got to really pack it.”87 
Even after the Court had sustained the Social Security Act 
on May 24, Roosevelt press secretary Steve Early told Scripps-
Howard columnist Raymond Clapper the president would 
continue the Court fight because he didn’t “know how long 
Hughes can keep Roberts liberal or how long Hughes will stay 
so.”88 A White House memorandum concluded that the 
President had secured “the liberalization of the interpretation of 
the Constitution,” but had not yet attained “insurance of the 
continuity of that liberalism.”89 The President and his advisors 
were still counting Hughes and Roberts as conservatives. 
But if the addition of two or three more justices to the 
Court would not solve the problem, why did the President insist 
upon six? Would not the addition of four bring the 
Administration’s margin from 6–3 against to 7–6 in favor?90 And 
would not the addition of five more justices increase that margin 
to 8–6? 
Roosevelt recognized that even such larger additions would 
not provide him with the assurance he desired. More than two 
 
Cummings (Apr. 9, 1937) (on file with the University of Virginia). Indeed, by April 19, at 
Cummings’ request, Solicitor General Stanley Reed had prepared the text of four 
possible constitutional amendments limiting judicial tenure: One that would require all 
sitting and future judges and justices to retire at 70; one that would terminate service at 
70, but only for judges and justices appointed after ratification; one that would limit the 
tenure of all post-ratification appointees to nine years; and one, more complicated, 
providing for staggered nine year terms and implicating sitting judges and justices. 
Memorandum from the Solicitor General to the Attorney General (Apr. 19, 1937) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Virginia). This may have been at 
least in part a response to a report from Joe Keenan that the President’s bill no longer 
enjoyed the backing of a key member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Carl Hatch of 
New Mexico. See Memorandum by Joseph B. Keenan for the Attorney General, on the 
Court Reorganization Bill (Apr. 1, 1937) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the 
University of Virginia), at the bottom of which appears the following handwritten note: 
“We seem now to be losing the support of Senator Hatch. Indeed unless we can change 
him he is definitely against us. JBK.” 
 87. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 3, at 159, 214; MCKENNA, supra note 2, at 
443; SOLOMON, supra note 4, at 185.  
 88. Leuchtenburg, “Packing” Plan, supra note 10, at 98 (quoting Raymond Clapper, 
Diary (May 24, 1937) (unpublished manuscript). 
 89. MacColl, supra note 2, at 438; Leuchtenburg, “Packing” Plan, supra note 10, at 
98, n. 80. 
 90. Such a proposal was also suggested to the President in correspondence from 
citizens. See LEUCHTENBURG, Origins, supra note 6, at 367, 376. 
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years earlier the President had promised the first available seat 
to Senate Majority Leader Joe Robinson of Arkansas. The 
pledge, which was tendered at Robinson’s request, had been 
made through Postmaster General Jim Farley as a reward for the 
majority leader’s loyal assistance in whipping New Deal 
legislation through the Congress.91 Yet as faithful and effective as 
Robinson had been as a congressional lieutenant, Roosevelt and 
the liberals inside and outside of his Administration feared that 
Robinson would vote as a conservative once he had been 
invested with life tenure on the Court.92 He had opposed the 
government construction of an electric power plant at Muscle 
Shoals in Alabama in the 1920s; he had been troubled by the 
NIRA’s codes of fair competition; and he worried that the 
current deficit spending would “bankrupt the country and tend 
to centralize all power in the national government.”93 
Many New Dealers thus saw Robinson as “one who served 
the cause out of duty and party loyalty but in his heart and mind 
was not really one of them.”94 In an editorial entitled, “Robinson 
Will Not Do!,” the Nation reminded its readers that “[a] 
Supreme Court Justice is not responsible to the president who 
appoints him.” Robinson was “a conservative Southern 
provincial Democrat.” His “closest bonds” were “with the 
Arkansas planter,” and Harvey Couch, “the utilities magnate of 
the region,” was “his fishing mate.” “That a man who so 
thoroughly represents the ruling class in Arkansas should be 
elevated to the Supreme Court at this juncture,” the editors 
warned, “is ironical and dangerous.”95 
Roosevelt’s promise to Robinson meant that the President’s 
first appointment under any compromise plan would bring the 
number of conservatives on the Court to seven. A two-justice 
compromise thus would bring the margin from 6-3 to 7-4. A 
three justice compromise would only narrow the gap to 7-5. A 
 
 91. Good Soldier, TIME, July 15, 1935; Joseph Alsop, Jr. & Turner Catledge, Joe 
Robinson, The New Deal’s Old Reliable, THE SATURDAY EVENING POST, September 26, 
1936; ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 3, at 156–58; Leuchtenburg, “Packing” Plan, 
supra note 10, at 100; SHOGAN, supra note 10, at 200; SOLOMON, supra note 4, at 185–86; 
SHESOL, supra note 3, at 309. 
 92. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 3, at 211; Leuchtenburg, “Packing” Plan, 
supra note 10, at 100; MCKENNA, supra note 2, at 470; SOLOMON, supra note 4, at 186, 
201. How Robinson actually would have voted had he become a justice was and is of 
course only a matter of conjecture. 
 93. SHOGAN, supra note 20, at 200–02. See also ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 3, 
at 157–58. 
 94. SHOGAN, supra note 20, at 202. 
 95. Robinson Will Not Do!, THE NATION, May 29, 1937, at 607–08. 
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four-justice compromise would still leave Roosevelt short of a 
working majority at 7-6. And even a five-justice deal would 
produce only a 7-7 deadlock, which might well affirm an adverse 
lower-court decision by an equally divided bench. Six justices 
was the absolute minimum number of appointments that FDR 
required to insure a dependable Court. 
The President’s bill would have provided for the 
appointment of an additional justice for each sitting justice who 
had not retired within six months following his seventieth 
birthday. Justice McReynolds had proposed such a measure with 
respect to lower-court judges when he had been Attorney 
General back in 1913, and it is often observed that Roosevelt 
and Cummings took great delight in hoisting the curmudgeonly 
justice by his own petard.96 But FDR had an additional reason to 
be delighted by McReynolds’ formula: it provided him with 
precisely the number of appointments that he needed. Setting 
the age threshold higher would have frustrated this purpose. 
An undated Justice Department memorandum listing the 
birthdays and ages of the justices as of January 1, 1937, 
illustrates the point. At the bottom of the page appear 
handwritten notes observing the ages of Brandeis (80) and Van 
Devanter (77), and the dates upon which three other justices 
would reach the age of seventy-five: McReynolds (February 3, 
1937); Sutherland (March 25, 1937); and Hughes (April 11, 
1937). The handwritten notes do not mention any of the other 
four sitting justices. These notes suggest that Cummings and the 
President may have considered the possibility of a bill that would 
have authorized FDR to appoint an additional justice for each 
sitting justice who had reached the age of seventy-five without 
retiring. There were three such justices by the time that 
Roosevelt announced his plan on February 5, and such a bill 
would have given the President a total of five additional 
appointments by April 11, 1937. But that was not enough. The 
age had to be lower. Stone, Roberts, and Cardozo each was in 
his sixties, but Justice Butler, who was born on March 17, 1866, 
was now a little more than six months beyond his seventieth 
birthday. The appeal of McReynolds’ formulation was that it 
 
 96. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 3, at 33–36; LEUCHTENBURG, Origins, supra 
note 6, at 391–92, 394; Leuchtenburg, “Packing” Plan, supra note 10, at 74. See also Diary 
of Homor Cummings (Jan. 17, 1937) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the 
University of Virginia). 
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swept in just enough justices to assure Roosevelt of a working 
majority.97 
The promise to Robinson was thus the fly in the ointment of 
any potential compromise on the number of justices. There was, 
however, another potential avenue to secure a liberal majority 
on the Court: inducing the conservative justices to retire. It was 
widely rumored that both Justice Van Devanter and Justice 
Sutherland wished to leave the bench. Van Devanter had served 
on the Court since 1911, and at the age of seventy-seven was 
ready to step down. The seventy-four year old Sutherland’s high 
blood pressure required that he write most of his opinions in 
bed, and he was similarly anxious to lighten his burden. 98 Yet the 
state of the judicial pension system at the time did not protect 
justices who had resigned from the Supreme Court from 
reductions in their stipends. Indeed, shortly after Justice Holmes 
had retired in 1932, the Economy Bill of 1933 had slashed his 
pension in half.99 
In his capacity as Chair of the House Judiciary Committee, 
Hatton Sumners had sought to remove this disincentive to 
judicial retirement by introducing a bill that would allow 
Supreme Court justices to retire at full pay. The House had 
perversely rejected the bill in 1935,100 but after the President had 
introduced his Court-packing bill, Sumners’ proposal quickly 
sailed to passage in both the House and the Senate, and FDR 
signed it into law March 1.101 In February, while his proposal was 
working its way to the President’s desk, Sumners urged 
Roosevelt to accept the judicial retirement bill as an alternative 
to the Court-packing plan. Once it was enacted, Sumners 
represented, he could persuade at least two justices—
presumably Van Devanter and Sutherland—to retire. But 
though the President did not oppose Sumners’ bill, he rejected 
the suggestion that he abandon his own proposal. As James 
Roosevelt wrote of the proposal in his diary, “It wouldn’t really 
 
 97. Memorandum on the Ages of Federal Judges (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with the University of Virginia). 
 98. 2 MERLO J. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 302 (1963); THE 
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 302 (David J. Danelski & 
Joseph S. Tulchin eds., 1973); MacColl, supra note 2, at 146–47, 430; Paul A. Freund, 
Charles Evans Hughes as Chief Justice, 81 HARV. L. REV. 4, 43 (1967). 
 99. BAKER, supra note 3, at 67–68.  
 100. WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY: THE NEW LEGALITY 38 (1970). 
 101. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 3, at 77; SWINDLER, supra note 100, at 69; Act 
of March 1, 1937, ch. 21, 50 Stat. 24. 
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cure the situation even if [Sumners] succeeds. . . .”102 For even if 
the pension bill were to induce these two conservative justices to 
retire, Roosevelt would have to appoint Robinson to one of their 
seats. The appointment of a liberal justice to the second vacancy 
would still leave the Court in the control of a conservative 5-4 
majority. 
The enactment of the pension bill did induce the retirement 
of Justice Van Devanter, who on May 18 announced his 
intention to leave the Court at the end of the term. Yet 
Roosevelt did not immediately announce the nomination that 
Robinson and his friends were now expecting. Instead, the 
President dithered for two weeks.103 The Senate Judiciary 
Committee recently had voted not to recommend his Court bill, 
which appeared to be in deep trouble in the upper chamber. 
Privately, FDR confided to Treasury Secretary Henry 
Morgenthau that he could not appoint Robinson because he was 
“not sufficiently liberal.” “If I had three vacancies,” the 
President continued, “I might be able to sandwich in Joe 
Robinson.” But, he told Morgenthau, he had no idea who, if 
anyone, might retire in the immediate future.104 If the retirements 
of, say, Sutherland and McReynolds were to provide two 
additional vacancies, then the appointment of Robinson along 
with two liberals would give Roosevelt a 5-4 working majority on 
the Court. But if the two additional vacancies came from the 
retirements of, say, Brandeis and Cardozo, then filling Van 
Devanter’s seat with a Robinson appointment would offer no 
net gain whatsoever. It would remain a Court of six 
conservatives and three liberals.105 
 
 102. SHESOL, supra note 3, at 345.  
 103. SHOGAN, supra note 20, at 202. 
 104. MCKENNA, supra note 2, at 469–70 (quoting, HENRY S. MORGENTHAU, JR., 
DIARIES, 69, 308–09). Roosevelt later claimed that he would have named Robinson to 
the Court, see JAMES A. FARLEY, JIM FARLEY’S STORY: THE ROOSEVELT YEARS 89 
(1948), and both Charles Michelson and FDR secretary Grace Tully confirm this. See 
CHARLES MICHELSON, THE GHOST TALKS 182 (1944); GRACE TULLY, F.D.R. MY BOSS 
224 (1949). Indeed, the White House came to recognize that failure to fulfill the pledge to 
Robinson would set off a revolt in the Senate. See ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 3, at 
209–14; MCKENNA, supra note 2, at 458–60, 467–72; SHESOL, supra note 3, at 448–53, 
458–60. 
 105. At a meeting with the President on July 6, Senator Burton Wheeler told 
Roosevelt that Republican Senator William Borah of Idaho had authorized him to 
promise the resignation of two more justices if FDR would withdraw his Court bill. 
Wheeler assured Roosevelt that he had their word that the resignations would be 
forthcoming, but a doubtful Roosevelt nevertheless declined the offer. SOLOMON, supra 
note 4, at 225–26. 
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The retirement of Justice Van Devanter did change 
Roosevelt’s initial calculus, however. To be sure, Robinson’s 
appointment to the vacant seat would not reduce the number of 
conservatives on the Court. There still would be six of them. But 
because he no longer was required to appoint Robinson to one 
of the additional seats that would have been created by his 
original Court-packing bill, FDR now needed fewer additional 
appointments to insure a liberal majority. At this point he 
needed only four additional justices to bring the number of 
liberals from three to what would now be a commanding seven. 
Thus, when Roosevelt finally summoned an irritated Robinson 
to the White House in early June, and Robinson reported that 
FDR’s six-justice plan was dead, the President authorized the 
majority leader to work out the best compromise he could 
salvage.106 However, he cautioned the aspiring justice that “if 
there was to be a bride there must also be bridesmaids—at least 
four of them.”107 Again, this number was not selected at random. 
A four-justice compromise opened the possibility of raising 
the age triggering appointment of an additional justice from 
seventy to seventy-five. Brandeis, McReynolds, Sutherland, and 
Hughes each had reached that age by mid-April of 1937, so that 
even after the retirement of the aged Van Devanter there would 
be enough elderly justices to provide Roosevelt with the 
necessary number of appointments. Even the addition of a six-
month grace period would enable the President to nominate four 
additional justices by October 11, 1937, only a week into the 
Court’s next term. Kentucky Representative Fred Vinson 
prepared just such a bill for introduction in early June.108 On 
June 4, Cummings sent Solicitor General Stanley Reed a new 
 
 106. SOLOMON, supra note 4, at 218; SHOGAN, supra note 20, at 204. 
 107. 2 HAROLD L. ICKES, THE SECRET DIARY OF HAROLD L. ICKES 153 (1954). 
 108. MCKENNA, supra note 2, at 471 n.17. Vinson’s bill provided:  
(a) When any judge of a court of the United States, appointed to hold his office 
during good behavior, has heretofore or hereafter attained the age of seventy-
five years and has held a commission or commissions as judge of any such court 
or courts at least ten years, continuously or otherwise, and within six months 
thereafter has neither resigned nor retired, the President, for each such judge 
who has not so resigned or retired, shall nominate, and by and with the advice 
and consent of the Senate, shall appoint one additional judge to the court to 
which the former is commissioned.”  
See Memorandum from the Solicitor General to the Attorney General (June 1, 1937) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Virginia). Note that the 
provision for the appointment of an additional justice for any sitting justice who had 
served for at least ten years, whether continuously or not, and had not retired within six 
months of his seventy-fifth birthday, served to sweep in Hughes, who had served more 
than ten years, but not continuously. 
!!!CUSHMAN-291-COURT-PACKING AND COMPROMISE.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 8/9/2013  2:15 PM 
20 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 29:1 
 
proposed bill which would have provided for a Court of no fewer 
than eleven justices.109 The bill would have amended the Judicial 
Code to provide that “[t]he Supreme Court shall consist of a 
Chief Justice and ten Associate Justices. . . . If, however, at any 
time the number of justices eligible for retirement shall 
constitute a majority of the Court, the President with the advice 
and consent of the Senate shall appoint such number of 
additional justices as may be necessary to make the number of 
justices not eligible for retirement exceed by not more than one 
the number of justices eligible for retirement.”110 This proposal 
would have permitted FDR immediately to appoint two 
additional justices on top of the replacement for Van Devanter. 
Assuming that this latter spot went to the sixty-five year old 
Robinson, there would then be five justices over seventy and 
eligible for retirement: Hughes, Brandeis, McReynolds, 
Sutherland, and Butler. If Roosevelt offered the two additional 
appointments to persons under seventy, this bill would have 
given him no more additional appointments, and he would be 
stuck with a Court comprised by six conservatives and five 
liberals. But if Roosevelt strategically appointed liberal 
septuagenarians to these two additional seats, then those eligible 
for retirement would outnumber those below seventy by a 
margin of 7-4. Such strategic appointments would bootstrap four 
more additional appointments for the President, giving him a 
liberal margin of 9-6 on a Court of fifteen. This bill, which might 
have produced results very similar to those that would have 
followed from enactment of Roosevelt’s original plan, did not 
gain any traction in discussions with congressional leaders. 
Later in the month, the Administration was considering 
three different substitute bills. A brief cover memorandum 
accompanying the text of each of the proposals explained that 
“Draft No.1” would provide for “a permanent court of 11,” and 
permitted additional appointments for each sitting justice aged 
75 or older, but only one in each calendar year, with a maximum 
membership of 15. “This draft will permit filling Mr. Justice Van 
Devanter’s place and appointment of two new justices to bring 
the court up to 11. In addition, one additional justice may be 
appointed in 1937 and a second in 1938. This gives 4 
appointments now and a 5th in January.”111 Assuming that Van 
 
 109. See Memorandum from the Solicitor General to the Attorney General (June 7, 
1937) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Virginia).  
 110. Id. 
 111. Untitled Memorandum (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of 
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Devanter’s seat went to Robinson, this proposal would have 
permitted the appointment of three countervailing liberal 
justices in 1937, deadlocking the Court at 6–6. The appointment 
of an additional liberal in January of 1938 would have given 
Roosevelt his working majority less than halfway through the 
Court’s next term. 
The memorandum explained that “Draft No. 2” would also 
provide for “a permanent Court of 11.” This draft, however, 
would permit the appointment of additional justices only “if a 
majority of the Court is over 75,” and then only at the rate of 
one per calendar year and with a maximum membership of 15. 
The memorandum explained that, because only four of the 
current justices of what would become an eleven-member Court 
were over 75, “[t]he provisions for additional justices because of 
an aged Court will not be operative unless every justice now 
over 66 stays on the Court until March 2, 1945 (when both 
Butler and Cardozo have become 75).” Only then would a 
majority of the Court be over 75. Thus, the memo explained, this 
proposal would “permit filling Mr. Justice Van Devanter’s place 
and also the appointment of two new justices to bring the Court 
up to 11.”112 Assuming that Van Devanter’s seat went to 
Robinson, this proposal therefore would have given FDR only 
five reliable votes on an 11-member Court. Only with the 
retirement of another conservative justice would Roosevelt have 
his majority. 
The memorandum explained that “Draft No. 3” would 
provide for “a permanent court of 9.” Additional justices could 
be appointed for each justice over 75, but only one per calendar 
year, and with a maximum membership of 15. The memorandum 
observed that “[t]his draft will permit filling Mr. Justice Van 
Devanter’s place and also the appointment of one additional 
justice in 1937 and a second in 1938. This gives two appointments 
and a third in January.”113 Again assuming Robinson’s 
appointment to Van Devanter’s seat, and assuming no further 
deaths or resignations, this proposal would have resulted in a 6–4 
conservative majority for the remainder of 1937, a 6–5 
conservative majority in 1938, and a deadlocked Court in 1939. 
Only in January of 1940 would the President have his 7–6 liberal 
majority. 
 
Virginia). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
!!!CUSHMAN-291-COURT-PACKING AND COMPROMISE.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 8/9/2013  2:15 PM 
22 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 29:1 
 
Moreover, as a Justice Department memorandum pointed 
out, the proposal’s provision for a permanent Court of nine 
meant that if a sitting justice were to retire, resign, or die during 
a year in which there were more than nine justices on the Court, 
that justice could not be replaced with a new appointment. Thus, 
to illustrate, assume that Robinson were appointed to Van 
Devanter’s seat, that Black were appointed as an additional 
justice in 1937, that Reed were appointed as an additional justice 
in 1938, that Frankfurter were appointed as an additional justice 
in 1939, and that there were no other personnel changes to the 
Court. As of 1939 the Court would consist of twelve justices, 
evenly divided between liberals and conservatives. Now suppose 
that as a result of some combination of retirements and deaths 
Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo all were to leave the Court in 
1939. Under these circumstances, the memo pointed out, 
Roosevelt could appoint replacements for none of them. The 
Court would shrink back to a membership of nine, with six 
conservatives and three liberals. Roosevelt could appoint an 
additional justice in 1940, but that would only bring the margin 
back to 6–4 in favor of the conservatives. Assuming no 
conservative deaths or retirements, it would be January of 1942 
before the Court was even back to its 1939 deadlock, and 1943 
before the President would have his majority. Thus, the memo 
observed, “[t]his plan will not add to the opportunity to 
liberalize the bench by filling normal vacancies through death, 
retirement or resignation. The effect of its provisions for 
shrinking back to nine in the present condition of the Court will 
probably work out practically as merely substituting one 
appointment a year under the ‘age principle’ for the normal 
expectancy of one appointment a year by filling vacancies 
occasioned through resignation, retirement or death.”114 
Even an additional conservative resignation would not solve 
Roosevelt’s problem. Again, assume Robinson’s appointment to 
Van Devanter’s seat, Black’s appointment as an additional 
justice in 1937, and Reed’s appointment as an additional justice 
in January of 1938. Assuming no other personnel changes, this 
would yield a 6-5 conservative majority. Now assume that 
immediately following Reed’s appointment Sutherland were to 
retire. Under the terms of the proposal, FDR would not be 
entitled to appoint a successor to Sutherland, and the Court 
would deadlock at 5-5 for the remainder of 1938. Only in 
 
 114. Memorandum on the Features of the Proposed Plan, supra note 62. 
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January of 1939 would the President be authorized to appoint a 
third additional justice to secure a 6-5 majority. Thus, the memo 
pointed out, ‘“[e]ven if Mr. Justice Sutherland should retire 
during 1938 there would thus be no assurance of a liberal 
majority during 1938.”115 
The author of the memo worried that “[t]his raises very real 
practical risks over the next two years in view of the following 
facts: 
(1) The cases which will come before the Court in the 
next and the succeeding terms will be power cases (on 
which the present court showed its teeth on the last 
decision day)116 and labor cases (Wagner Act117 and 
Black-Connery Bill118) which the new statute providing 
for direct appeal will bring to the Court a year earlier 
than heretofore.” 
(2) After the passage of the Supreme Court statute, 
Hughes and Roberts will have no further incentive for 
shot-gun liberalism and are far more likely to be 
actuated by impulses of revenge. 
(3) After any new judges have been appointed by this 
Administration, the Court will have become the 
Administration’s ‘packed court’—beyond criticism by 
the Administration.”119 
“Under such circumstances,” the memo concluded, “the 
present form of the proposed provisions for shrinking the Court 
back to nine make them exceedingly dangerous.” It was “very 
important that: (1) The Court should reach its maximum liberal 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. The reference here is to the Court’s announcement on June 1 that it had 
granted certiorari in Alabama Power v. Ickes and Iowa City Light & Power Co. v. Ickes, 
301 U.S. 681 (1937), challenging the power of the Public Works Administration to make 
loans and grants to municipalities in order to construct and operate electrical power 
plants that would compete with private companies in the production and distribution of 
electricity. Alabama Power would be decided in early 1938, see infra note 141. The 
decree in Iowa City would be vacated and the case dismissed as moot in October of 1937, 
see 302 U.S. 769 (1937). 
 117. The reference here is presumably to Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. NLRB, 
303 U.S. 453 (1938), Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 188 (1938), and NLRB 
v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939), each of which involved questions of the power of 
Congress under the National Labor Relations Act to regulate the labor relations of 
companies engaged in manufacturing or production. 
 118. The Black-Connery bill, which would form the basis of what would become the 
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, had been introduced in Congress on May 24. John S. 
Forsythe, Legislative History of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 464, 465-90 (1939). 
 119. Memorandum on the Features of the Proposed Plan, supra note 62. 
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strength as quickly as possible because the crucial years for 
decisions under the New Deal are the next two when the statutes 
passed this year120 will be under adjudication,” and “(2) Because 
of the accusations of a packed Court and the necessity for public 
confidence in the new decisions, the liberal majorities should be 
as wide as possible as soon as possible.” The proposed bill did 
not achieve those critical objectives.121 
Located in the Homer Cummings papers is an unsigned 
speech, apparently prepared early in the Court fight, which 
argued that securing a liberal Court majority was a matter of 
pressing urgency and that pursuit of a constitutional amendment 
would involve unacceptable delay. The speech concluded by 
urging its audience to “[f]ollow the judgment of the President 
and leader who has never failed your needs nor failed to win 
your battles. Follow his judgment that a bird in the hand this 
Spring is worth far more than the same bird in the bush three or 
four years from now!”122 The consideration of Drafts 2 and 3 
evinced a recognition that the bird that the President had sought 
in the Spring was no longer within his grasp, and that he might 
indeed have to wait nearly three years to possess it. 
The bill ultimately introduced in the Senate by Robinson 
was a variation on Draft No. 3. It permitted the appointment, at 
the rate of no more than one per year, of an additional justice for 
each sitting justice aged seventy-five or older. Robinson’s bill 
solved the problem of Court shrinkage identified in the Justice 
Department memorandum by allowing the President to fill 
vacancies caused by death, resignation, or retirement if it were 
 
 120. In March Congress had passed a second Bituminous Coal Conservation Act to 
replace the one struck down in Carter v. Carter Coal Co. The Administration also 
anticipated the passage in 1937 of the Fair Labor Standards Act and a new Agricultural 
Adjustment Act to replace the statute invalidated in United States v. Butler, but neither 
was enacted until 1938. Roosevelt also hoped for passage of Senator George Norris’s 
regional planning bill, the so-called “seven little TVA’s,” but that measure also failed of 
passage. WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 
161–62, 250–51, 255, 261–62 (1963) [hereinafter LEUCHTENBURG, NEW DEAL]; DEXTER 
PERKINS, THE NEW AGE OF FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT 63 (1957); RONALD L. FEINMAN, 
TWILIGHT OF PROGRESSIVISM: THE WESTERN REPUBLICAN SENATORS AND THE NEW 
DEAL 137–39 (1981); MCKENNA, supra note 2, at 442; SOLOMON, supra note 4, at 258. 
 121. Memorandum on the Features of the Proposed Plan, supra note 62. “Under 
such circumstances, it would seem that the Administration’s supporters in Congress 
intended that the idea of one new judge a year for each judge over 75 should not be in 
substitution for but additional to the normal filling of vacancies in the Court occasioned 
by the death, retirement or resignation of any justice whether or not over 75.” Id. See 
also Memorandum on the Proposed Substitute Court Bill (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with the Unversity of Virginia). 
 122. The Real Issue (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of 
Virginia). 
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necessary to maintain at no fewer than nine the number of 
justices under the age of 75. But it did nothing to increase the 
rate at which additional justices might be appointed, and 
therefore nothing to ameliorate the concern that the Court 
might remain under conservative control until January of 1940.123 
Debate on the substitute bill began July 6.124 Robinson 
believed that a narrow majority of Senators ultimately would 
vote for the bill,125 but it faced the prospect of a dogged filibuster 
in the upper chamber126 and the determined opposition of the 
Judiciary Committee in the House.127 The bill never would 
surmount either of these hurdles. As the week wore on votes 
began to slip away,128 and the Washington summer heat and the 
strain of the struggle took their toll on the Majority Leader. On 
July 14 he was found dead of a heart attack on the floor of his 
Capitol Hill apartment.129 
Robinson’s death sealed the fate of the substitute bill. A 
number of Senators had pledged to support the measure only 
out of personal affection for the Majority Leader.130 Four of 
these legislators paid an unscheduled call to the White House on 
July 15 and pleaded with the President to withdraw the 
substitute bill and agree to some other accommodation. Once 
again, the President rejected the overture.131 Within a week the 
number of defecting Democrats had grown even larger, and 
Vice-President Garner informed Roosevelt that he lacked the 
votes to pass the bill in the Senate. Roosevelt authorized Garner 
 
 123. 81 Cong. Rec. 6788 (July 6, 1937). Cf. William E. Leuchtenburg, FDR’s Court-
Packing Plan: A Second Life, A Second Death, 1985 DUKE L.J. 673, 680 (1985) 
[hereinafter Leuchtenburg, Second Life] (“Under this so-called “compromise,” FDR lost 
very little. The most immediate effect of the measure would be to permit Roosevelt by 
the beginning of January 1938—only six months away—to add three justices to the 
Court: one for the 1937 calendar year, one for the 1938 calendar year, and one to fill Van 
Devanter’s slot”); SHESOL, supra note 3, at 477–78 (Roosevelt “had not sacrificed much 
in terms of the Court bill’s provisions”). 
 124. MCKENNA, supra note 2, at 496–98.  
 125. Id. at 495; SOLOMON, supra note 4, at 235; MacColl, supra note 2, at 457, 463. 
 126. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 3, at 246, 248, 250; BAKER, supra note 3, at 
233–35, 239, 246–47; MCKENNA, supra note 2, at 499, 501; SOLOMON, supra note 4, at 
187, 220, 231, 235; SHESOL, supra note 3, at 475. 
 127. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 3, at 264–65; BAKER, supra note 3, at 243; 
MCKENNA, supra note 2, at 504; End of Strife, TIME, July 26, 1937. 
 128. End of Strife, supra note 127, at 10–13.  
 129. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 3, at 254–67; BAKER, supra note 3, at 240–53; 
MCKENNA, supra note 2, at 498–505. 
 130. PATTERSON, supra note 4, at 123; SOLOMON, supra note 4, at 242; MacColl, 
supra note 2, at 463; Leuchtenburg, Second Life, supra note 123, at 687. 
 131. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 3, at 269-70; BAKER, supra note 3, at 255–56; 
SOLOMON, supra note 4, at 242. 
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to seek another compromise, but Wheeler and the opposition 
stood firm against any enlargement of the Court.132 On July 22 
the Senate voted to recommit the bill to the Judiciary 
Committee with instructions that all provisions concerning the 
Court’s membership be deleted.133 Robinson’s death thus “was 
the end, not only of the original plan, but the compromise 
version as well.”134 “The death of Joe Robinson,” Professor 
Leuchtenburg concludes, “doomed all hopes for Roosevelt’s 
plan.”135 
But if Robinson’s death made passage of the compromise 
bill impossible, it also made it unnecessary.136 Unburdened of the 
obligation to appoint the conservative Arkansas Senator to Van 
Devanter’s seat, Roosevelt was now free to nominate the liberal 
Senator Hugo Black of Alabama, who was confirmed August 
17.137 This only narrowed the conservative margin from 6–3 to 5–
4, meaning that Roosevelt would need still another conservative 
retirement in order to secure his liberal majority. But that 
retirement would not be long in coming. Like his colleague 
Justice Van Devanter, Justice Sutherland actually made his 
decision to leave the Court shortly after the passage of Hatton 
Sumners’ judicial retirement bill in early March.138 He later 
informed several correspondents that the pendency of the Court-
packing plan was the only reason that he had not retired shortly 
thereafter.139 He would remain on the bench only for a portion of 
the 1937 October term, during which time he would participate 
 
 132. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 3, at 278–83; MCKENNA, supra note 2, at 514–
16; SOLOMON, supra note 4, at 248–50; Leuchtenburg, Second Life, supra note 123, at 
687. 
 133. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 3, at 285-94; BAKER, supra note 3, at 271–74; 
MCKENNA, supra note 2, at 517–21. 
 134. PATTERSON, supra note 4, at 123. 
 135. Leuchtenburg, “Packing” Plan, supra note 10, at 105. 
 136. See Senator Robinson’s Death Shocks the Nation, THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY, 
July 28, 1937, at 940 (“Harsh as it sounds to say it, Mr. Robinson’s death actually adds to 
the reasons why the President does not need any longer to have a court-packing bill 
passed in order to safeguard the legality of liberal legislation”); Death and Politics, supra 
note 44, at 88 (“however much the President personally mourns the loss of a close and 
devoted friend, the inherent consequences of Senator Robinson’s death should be, in 
political terms, favorable to the President’s larger program”). 
 137. Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States During the Time of these 
Reports, 302 U.S. iii (1937). 
 138. THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, supra note 98, 
at 303. 
 139. Letter from George Sutherland to Nicholas Murray Butler (Jan. 12, 1938) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Library of Congress); Letter from George 
Sutherland to Mr. Preston (Jan. 18, 1938) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the 
Library of Congress); Letter from George Sutherland to Richard R. Lyman (Jan. 21, 
1938) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Library of Congress). 
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in only a handful of significant cases. In none of these would he 
cast the deciding vote.140 He would not participate in any more 
cases involving the National Labor Relations Act, and his 
retirement came months before the Fair Labor Standards Act 
even became law. However, he did participate in the pending 
power cases about which the Justice Department memo had 
expressed such concern the preceding summer. In fact, he wrote 
the opinion in each case. And in each instance the Government’s 
position prevailed.141 
It was on January 5, 1938, just two days after he had 
awarded the Government its victory in the power cases, that 
Sutherland wrote to the President to inform him of his intention 
to retire on the 18th of the month. Roosevelt nominated Stanley 
Reed to replace Sutherland on January 15. The nomination was 
confirmed by the Senate on January 25, and Justice Reed 
assumed his seat on the Court on January 31.142 Reed’s 
replacement of Sutherland had at long last secured for the 
President the liberal Court majority he so intensely desired. On 
February 5, 1938, a year to the day after Roosevelt had 
announced his plan, and less than a week after Reed had taken 
the oath of office, Frank Gannett wrote to a correspondent: 
“‘Since the President now controls the Supreme Court, our only 
hope lies in influencing the members of Congress.’” “Little 
wonder,” observed Professor Leuchtenburg, “that Roosevelt 
claimed that he had lost the battle but won the war.”143 
In claiming that he had won the war, FDR meant that the 
Court-packing plan had induced the justices to uphold legislation 
that they would not otherwise have approved.144 This particular 
 
 140. See Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 77 (1937 (unanimously upholding Georgia 
poll tax); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (holding by a vote of 8–1 that the 
Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to the States); James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 
302 U.S. 134 (1937) (holding, by a vote of 5–4, that imposition of a state corporate 
income tax on a federal government contractor did not violate the federal government’s 
intergovernmental tax immunity). 
 141. Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938) (unanimously holding that a 
private power company lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of loans and 
grants made by the Public Works Administration to municipalities to construct and 
operate electrical generation and distribution systems in competition with the private 
company); Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, 302 U.S. 485 (1938) (same). 
 142. 303 U.S. iv (1938). 
 143. Leuchtenburg, “Packing” Plan, supra note 10, at 109 (quoting Letter from 
Frank Gannett to E.A. Dodd (Feb. 5, 1938) (unpublished manuscript)). 
 144. ROOSEVELT, supra note 7, at lxvi–lxxii. See also Memorandum (July, 1939) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Virginia) and Supplemental 
Memorandum (July, 1939) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of 
Virginia). Others have shared Roosevelt’s view. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Is the 
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claim is quite doubtful.145 Indeed, the Administration’s 
assessment of the longer-term reliability of Hughes and Roberts 
as supporters of economic regulation proved to be correct. 
Though they would vote to uphold a number of New Deal 
initiatives after 1937,146 these two justices nevertheless persisted 
in voting to invalidate federal and state regulations of the 
economy on the grounds that they violated the Takings147 or Due 
Process Clauses148 of the Fifth Amendment, or the Due 
Process,149 Equal Protection,150 or Privileges or Immunities151 
 
Supreme Court A “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 103, 132 (2010) (“The 
conventional wisdom among constitutional academics, focused narrowly on the Court 
itself, is that FDR lost the battle, but won the war”). 
 145. See MCKENNA, supra note 2, at xx–xxv, 436-37, 536; G. EDWARD WHITE, THE 
CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL (2000); BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW 
DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998); Richard 
D. Friedman, Switching Time and Other Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court and 
Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1893 (1994). 
 146. See, e.g., Phelps-Dodge Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941) (upholding National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) against Fifth Amendment challenge); Sunshine Anthracite 
Coal v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940) (upholding Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 
1937); Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939) (upholding Agricultural Adjustment Act of 
1938); NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939) (upholding NLRA against Commerce 
Clause challenge); Tennessee Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 306 U.S. 118 
(1939) (upholding right of TVA to sell electric power in competition with private power 
companies); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939) (upholding Tobacco Inspection Act of 
1935); Consolidated Edison v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938) (upholding NLRA against 
Commerce Clause challenge); United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938) (upholding 
Municipal Bankruptcy Act of 1937); NLRB v. Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co., 303 U.S. 453 
(1938) (upholding NLRA against Commerce Clause challenge); Electric Bond Co. v. 
SEC, 303 U.S. 419 (1938) (upholding Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935); 
Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938) (holding that privately-owned power 
companies had no standing to challenge the constitutionality of federal loans and grants 
to aid in the construction of municipally-owned power plants). 
 147. See United States v. Willow Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 511–15 (1945) (Roberts, 
J., and Stone, C.J., dissenting from opinion holding that government action reducing the 
flow of water available to an electrical power plant did not constitute a taking requiring 
compensation under the Fifth Amendment); United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324 
U.S. 386, 393 (1945) (Roberts, J., dissenting from opinion holding that the Fifth 
Amendment did not require compensation of riparian landowner whose property was 
reduced in market value but not invaded by government dredging operation). 
 148. See United States v. Rock-Royal Co-op, Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 583-87 (1939) 
(Roberts, J. and Hughes, C.J. dissenting from opinion upholding against a due process 
challenge an order issued by the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to the Agricultural 
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937). 
 149. See R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573, 577 (1940) 
(Roberts, J., and Hughes, C.J, dissenting from opinion holding that oil proration order of 
Texas Railroad Commission did not deprive the company of its property without due 
process); Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities, Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937) (Hughes, 
C.J., and Roberts, J., join opinion invalidating gas proration order of Texas Railroad 
commission on the ground that it deprived the company of its property without due 
process). 
 150. See Charleston Fed. Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Alderson, 324 U.S. 182, 192–92 
(1945) (Roberts, J., dissenting from opinion upholding tax assessments against equal 
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Clauses of the Fourteenth. Internal Court records reveal that it 
was only very reluctantly that Hughes agreed to join the portion 
of United States v. Darby152 upholding federal regulation of wages 
and hours of employees engaged in “production for 
commerce.”153 Such records similarly show that Roberts initially 
opposed upholding the regulation sustained in Wickard v. 
Filburn,154 and there is reason to doubt that either of the justices 
ultimately would have voted to sustain those measures had more 
of their colleagues shared their reservations. Even after Darby, 
Roberts would file dissents from decisions upholding the 
application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to various local 
employments on the ground that the Commerce Clause did not 
authorize Congress to reach them.155 And though he eventually 
acquiesced in the authority of these precedents,156 he continued 
to construe the statute not to apply to matters of purely local 
concern that he believed were reserved to the states.157 Roberts 
also persisted in registering dissenting objections to delegations 
of congressional authority to the executive branch,158 and 
throughout his tenure remained “in almost continuous 
opposition” to the claims of the administrative agencies that 
were integral to the New Deal vision of government.159 Roosevelt 
 
protection challenge); Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Insurance Co. v. Harrison, 
301 U.S. 459 (1937) (Hughes, C.J., joining opinion invalidating Georgia statute imposing 
different regulations on stock and mutual insurance companies). 
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and his advisors were right: Hughes and Roberts were not 
“dependable.” 
Yet there is truth to the larger claim that Roosevelt won the 
war, if only because the conflict was a war of attrition. Sumners’ 
retirement bill was sufficient to assure the prompt departures of 
Van Devanter and Sutherland, which combined with Robinson’s 
death in July assured the President of a liberal Court majority. 
As Senator Ashurst counseled Roosevelt somewhat ghoulishly 
not long before the announcement of the Court-packing plan, 
“Father Time, with his scythe, is on your side.”160 
On the morning of February 5, 1937, Tommy Corcoran took 
a cab to the Supreme Court building. His task was to warn 
Justice Brandeis of the President’s forthcoming announcement 
of the Court-packing proposal before it became public 
knowledge. Corcoran entered the justices’ robing room to the 
disapproving looks of Hughes and McReynolds, and handed 
Brandeis a press release outlining the President’s proposal. After 
reading it, the Justice thanked Corcoran for his courtesy, but 
then added, “tell your president he has made a grave mistake. 
All he had to do was wait a little while. I’m sorry for him.”161 
Brandeis was, of course, correct. One can understand why, in 
early 1937, Roosevelt thought that he needed to expand the 
Court’s membership to fifteen in order to have a “dependable 
bench” within a reasonably short time. In retrospect, however, it 
becomes clear that the realization of this objective did not 
require any expansion of the Court at all. Meanwhile, the 
President’s Court-packing proposal helped to precipitate the 
formation of an opposition bloc in Congress that would frustrate 
much of his second-term legislative agenda.162 From the vantage 
of history, therefore, it appears that the Court-packing plan was 
an entirely unnecessary misadventure through which Roosevelt 
ultimately lost far more than he gained. 
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